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The  economies of Latin America have undergone important
transformations during the past years.  Yet, while there have
been many studies on the macroeconomic changes that have
taken place in Latin America, studies on the microeconomic
changes are relatively scarce. The purpose of this paper is to
provide evidence that leads to a better understanding of how
firms  respond  to  new  circumstances. The research on Latin
American manufacturing firms presented here shows that the
new state of the economic environment has led to a substantial
change in firms’ behaviour. Innovative firms have adopted
flexible forms of behaviour and are upgrading their production
and marketing capabilities, and they have introduced significant
changes  in  terms of  vertical integration, input procurement,
technological innovation, incentive pay systems and manage-
ment techniques, training, subcontracting, distribution and re-
tailing. At least for the most innovative consumer goods
manufacturing firms, their core activities have shifted from be-
ing mainly concerned with production to combining the manu-
facture of goods with their distribution, and often also the
distribution of other domestic and imported goods as well. This
provides them with a better chance of simultaneously increasing
their profits and defending their market share. Finally, the inves-
tigation  also  showed  that  uncertainty surrounding  economic
policy leads to a substantial decrease in investment by firms.
Such uncertainty explains why more firms do not change, or
why they do not change faster. It has a twofold negative effect
on entrepreneurs’ decisions to modernize their firms: they are
uncertain about what they should do, as well as about the
sustainability of the economic policy. There is therefore an im-
portant role for policies that redound in programmes that seek
to encourage firms to upgrade. At the same time, it must be
stressed that the most important role for policy is that of
creating a stable economic environment in which firms can plan
long-term investment.
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 101
Restructuring in
manufacturing:





The countries of Latin America have undergone im-
portant transformations in the past few years. There
have been radical changes in macroeconomic and
trade policies and in the general economic environ-
ment, such as in matters relating to State intervention
and the regulatory framework, accompanied by in-
creased globalization of world markets. As a result,
there have been important changes at the macro-
economic level and in the way the economies of the
region relate to the world economy, as well as in the
behaviour of firms.
While there have been many studies on the
macroeconomic changes that have taken place in
Latin America, studies on the microeconomic
changes are relatively scarce. One of the first of these
studies examined how Chilean firms adapted to such
changes during the 1970s and early 1980s (Corbo and
Sánchez, 1984). In recent years, along with a consen-
sus in most countries on what macroeconomic poli-
cies should be adopted to achieve long-term stability,
there has been a growing interest in research into
changes in manufacturing companies’ behaviour and
the way they are adapting to the new economic envi-
ronment (Baumann, 1994; Bielschowsky, 1994;
Castillo, Dini and Maggi, 1994; Katz and Burachik,
1997).
This paper presents the results of an investiga-
tion into manufacturing firms’ strategies and changes
in these strategies as a result of trade liberalization,
globalization, and transformations in the economic
environment in which they operate. The main ques-
tions this research set out to answer were the follow-
ing: Are Latin American firms in traditional
consumer goods manufacturing sectors changing
their strategies, or are they for the most part function-
ing as they did 20 years ago? How decisive is the
influence of macroeconomic events on microe-
conomic ones, and what is the margin that companies
have for individual behaviour? If traditional con-
sumer goods manufacturing firms’ behaviour is
changing, what are the most important areas in which
these changes are taking place? What are the strate-
gies of the firms in these industries that are most
advanced in the modernization process in the region?
This investigation was carried out in medium-
sized and large traditional consumer goods manufac-
turing firms in Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. From
the beginning, it was decided to focus mainly on such
firms, since it was assumed that they were among the
most representative of the medium-sized and large
manufacturing firms that could be found in all three
countries. The sectors included covered a wide range
of industries but strongly emphasized garment firms,
as a way of comparing the behaviour of firms across
countries in comparable industries, because garment
manufacturers belong to an industry that was estab-
lished several decades ago, not only in the countries
included in the research, but in most other Latin
American countries as well. It was also interesting
to study this industry because it has been strongly
exposed to competition from imports and has been
strongly affected by the globalization of the garment
sector worldwide.
Over 40 garment firms were included in the
study, although comparable data were only available
for 38 of them:1 hence, the conclusions presented in
this article are inferred mainly from this type of firm.2
Interviews with executives of the firms on the basis
of open-ended questionnaires were complemented
with plant visits, as well as with meetings with trade
association representatives, industry experts and gov-
ernment officials. Firms were chosen so as to provide
a diversity of companies, but it is not claimed that
they make up a representative sample. Most of the
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this paper.  The  basic  research  was carried out as part of  the
ECLAC/UNDP Project on Innovation and Competitiveness.
ECLAC staff members Wilson Peres, Martine Guerguil and the
author herself carried out the interviews.
1 See Macario (1998a).
2 However, they appear to be valid for other traditional con-
sumer goods manufacturing firms, such as those in the footwear
and leather industries (see Macario, 1998b).
interviews took place in 1993, but some were con-
ducted in 1994 and 1995. In some cases, the initial
interviews were supplemented by follow-up visits, so
as to obtain a better perspective of changes in com-
pany strategy over time.
The following section of this paper (section II)
describes the main characteristics of the behaviour of
traditional consumer goods manufacturing firms un-
der import substitution. It is partly based on the same
interviews with the executives, who were questioned
about the history of their firm. Section III presents
the main findings of the research concerning the be-
haviour of traditional consumer goods manufacturing
firms in the process of modernization, and the last
section (section IV) presents the main conclusions.
Finally, a warning is in order: while there are many
different definitions of competitiveness and indica-
tors for measuring it, in this paper the term “competi-
tive” is used as a synonym of “modernizing”: when a
company is described as being competitive, this
should be understood as meaning that it is an innova-
tive firm, striving for survival and change and trying
to find the most appropriate ways to adapt to a new




What are the main strategies of a firm manufacturing
consumer goods under import substitution? This sec-
tion tries to answer this question by describing the
main features of the evolution of a representative firm.
The typical firm interviewed in this survey is a
family company that was initially set up in a small
workshop in sectors such as garment or shoe produc-
tion, or a small metal-casting plant. This small work-
shop slowly expanded, buying new   equipment,
moving to new premises and becoming an authentic
manufacturing firm.
The transition from small workshop to manufac-
turing plant was often quite difficult and risky, in the
face of competition from many other similar work-
shops. Financial assistance for small firms was gener-
ally not available, so that one of the critical factors in
the transition was the ability to accumulate enough
financial resources to expand. Hence, very few work-
shops were able to be become manufacturing firms
unless the entrepreneurs were successful in obtaining
sufficient funds, often thanks to family support,
lobbying with government agencies, or sheer luck.
Production was generally initially organized
along the same lines as in the workshop, slowly
evolving subsequently into a pattern broadly based
on the organization of work in plants in industrialized
countries.
Plant layout was often designed by the entrepre-
neur himself. The firm manufactured a wide variety
of products with unsophisticated design and quality
standards. This was good enough for a growing body
of consumers who were just beginning to have access
to manufactured goods and were therefore not very
demanding.
Management was generally the responsibility of
family members and did not follow professional cri-
teria. Production workers were paid fixed wages or,
in some cases, were on piecework, without strict
quality requirements. Firms did not provide training.
Most production operations were carried out in-
ternally in the firm. Subcontracting was very rare and
was only used for very specific operations that were
difficult to carry out in the plant itself, or to satisfy
unexpected surges in demand.
In general, inputs were manufactured within the
country, in view of the prevailing import substitution
policies, as well as the costs and delays involved in
importing them from abroad. Larger firms tended to
be vertically integrated, manufacturing inputs not
only for their own use but also to sell to other domes-
tic firms. There was a powerful incentive for firms to
become as integrated as possible, since companies
selling intermediate goods were often rivals in the
finished product market.
Most goods produced were sold on the domestic
market. It was generally difficult for consumer goods
manufacturers to export on a regular basis for a
number of reasons, such as the anti-export bias result-
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ing from high tariffs or from non-tariff barriers; the
relatively low level of the exchange rate in most
countries throughout nearly all of the import substitu-
tion period; and the very high transportation costs
within the region.
Tariff and non-tariff barriers in other Latin
American countries which could have been among
the most attractive markets also helped to make ex-
porting  less appealing. Protectionism and transport
costs made it difficult to export to the industrialized
countries.
For the most part, firms tended to export occa-
sionally to neighbouring countries, particularly those
with a lower degree of industrial development. Ex-
ports were countercyclical, increasing when there was a
drop in domestic demand or a depreciation of the ex-
change rate. The products exported were the same
ones that the firms sold on the domestic market. The
system of incentives was such that most consumer
goods firms specialized in producing for the domestic
market, protected from external competition.
When they managed to overcome the initial
financial constraints and reached a certain produc-
tion threshold, companies generally had relatively
easy access to financial support from the govern-
ment, which provided credit at low and often subsi-
dized interest rates. This allowed them to continue
expanding. Once they reached this stage, the pres-
sures to increase productivity were not as strong as in
the previous stage.
In addition, by the time the firm had established
a manufacturing plant of an adequate scale for the
dimensions of the domestic market, competitive pres-
sures from similar domestic companies were consid-
erably reduced. The small size of the domestic
market often allowed it to be controlled by a limited
number of firms engaged in collaborative behaviour,
dividing  it up  into market shares  which  remained
quite stable over time.
Therefore, once a typical consumer goods
manufacturing firm had achieved a  certain  mini-
mum production scale and a given share of the do-
mestic market, it would reach a plateau. It was
perfectly possible for the firm to continue operat-
ing in this way: with family-style management
there were no strong pressures pushing the firm to
continue evolving, and its environment became
quite stable and safe.
The lack of strong competitive pressures, once
the firm had passed a certain threshold, had repercus-
sions on the way production was organized. Hence,
while  production was broadly organized following
the guidelines used in industrialized countries, firms
were not obliged to continue introducing changes to
improve productivity and quality.
The import-substitution-based development
model allowed the countries of the region to create
a manufacturing sector. Without it, most of them
would now have a substantially smaller number of
industrial firms. This model made possible the
learning and evolution that allowed a workshop to
be turned into a manufacturing firm. It also helped
to transform several generations of rural migrants
into industrial production workers. Indeed, a sub-
stantial proportion of the manufactured goods the
region exports nowadays comes from firms that
exist thanks to import substitution industrializa-
tion policies.  However,  by the  1960s  this model
had become a constraint on the development of the
Latin American countries (ECLAC, 1994).
Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, most
of the countries in the region substantially trans-
formed their macroeconomic and trade policies, as
well as most of the regulatory environment. These
changes had a considerable impact on firms in the
region, altering the framework they were used to op-
erating in and submitting them to strong competition
from imports.
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III
The behaviour of firms
in the 1990s: Main findings
1. The influence of macroeconomic and trade
policies
What influence do macroeconomic and trade policies
have on firms’ behaviour? An examination of the
differences in behaviour between firms in Chile,
Mexico and Venezuela, and of the evolution within a
given country over time, would be useful for assess-
ing this influence.
Most Chilean firms had maintained or increased
their production levels in the year that preceded the
interviews, thanks to the general macroeconomic
stability and sustained growth of Chile. This result
was also due to the fact that the firms which had
managed to survive the shock of the industrial re-
structuring that took place at the end of the 1970s and
the beginning of the 1980s were relatively  strong,
even under the pressure of increased competition
from imports.
Mexican firms displayed two types of behaviour.
Most of them had suffered a sharp drop of up to 30%
in their output in response to the slow rate of growth
of the Mexican economy up to 1993 and the in-
creased import penetration. However, several firms
which had invested heavily in upgrading and/or
which exported had increased their output.
In contrast, most Venezuelan firms had suffered
a sharp drop in output owing   to the considerable
decrease in demand resulting from the political un-
certainty in the latter part of 1992 and very strong
competition from imports.
Macroeconomic changes appear to have become
even more important for manufacturing firms after
trade liberalization. For example, appreciation of
the exchange rate results in a substantial increase
in competition from imports in a very short period of
time.
Further evidence of the impact of macroeconomic
trends on firms’ behaviour is the evolution of exports
by Chilean firms. While in 1990 several of the com-
panies surveyed in that country belonged to a cate-
gory that  could be  classified as having “moderate
exports”, regularly exporting between 5% and 10%
of their output, by 1992 there were no firms in this
category in Chile: either they had opted out of the
export market completely or had substantially in-
creased their export efforts and the percentage of out-
put they exported. The growth of domestic demand,
combined with an appreciation of the exchange rate,
polarized the firms’ export behaviour, causing most
of them to focus exclusively on the domestic market,
while those which wished to continue exporting had
to  become increasingly specialized in that market.
This is illustrated by the fact that while, among
Chilean firms interviewed in given sectors, the
number of firms exporting decreased as the exchange
rate appreciated, the average exports for those that
habitually exported increased from  15.6% of  their
output in 1990 to 44% in 1992.
The fact that the evolution of the firms’ output
was heavily influenced by macroeconomic events in
all three countries shows the importance of the
macroeconomic environment for company behaviour.
Similarly, there is a clear link between export
behaviour and the degree of openness of the econ-
omy: none of the Venezuelan firms visited were ex-
porting at the time of the interviews (March 1993),
whereas there were several exporting firms in Chile
and even more in Mexico. These two countries had
liberalized trade before Venezuela, and it was clear
that there would be no reversal of this policy. Vene-
zuela, on the other hand, had liberalized trade late in
the 1980s but, at the time of the interviews, there
were serious doubts that this policy would be sus-
tained. The events which have taken place in Vene-
zuela since then have proved that this was a correct
assessment of the situation.
The strong influence of macroeconomic and trade
policies on firms’ behaviour means that the implica-
tions of these policies must be carefully evaluated.
Similarly, the effects produced on firms’ behaviour
by uncertainty in respect of economic policy must
also be taken into account. An example of this is
what took place in Venezuela from 1993 on.
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2. The margin for microeconomic behaviour
However, in spite of the considerable influence of
the economic environment on firms, the research
also leads to the conclusion that there is a margin
for company strategy: not all the Chilean firms were
modernizers, not all the Venezuelan firms were
going under.
Some firms can manage to be competitive in spite
of an adverse environment and of being in a subsec-
tor where there is very strong competition from im-
ports. One example of this are two Venezuelan firms
that were willing to continue investing, training their
personnel and to search for new survival strategies
while most firms in that country were seeing their
output drop and their market share dwindle owing to
the recession and to competition from imports. These
modernizing firms had gambled that they would sur-
vive and were following an active upgrading strategy
in order to be competitive.
Another example can be seen in several Mexican
industries characterized by particularly strong import
penetration, such as the garment and shoe industries.
While many firms in these industries had closed
down, several surviving firms were doing remarkably
well, thanks to their efforts to adapt to the new envi-
ronment.
More research should be carried out on individ-
ual company  strategies and the capability of some
firms to learn and adapt to a new environment. There
is much to be learnt from these firms, and knowing
more about their strategy would be useful for policy
design. Efforts should also be made to provide eco-
nomic theory  with a more solid theoretical frame-
work for analysing the scope for microeconomic
behaviour (Nelson, 1991).
3. Changes in firms’ behaviour
The general behaviour of a manufacturing firm under
import substitution, as described above, is still an ac-
curate description of the behaviour of some firms to-
day. However, the research led to the conclusion that
the behaviour of many firms in the region is undergo-
ing substantial change.
The interviews with company executives and
private-sector representatives carried out during the
investigation showed that the entrepreneurial envi-
ronment is very dynamic and that changes are taking
place. It is possible that many more transformations
are occurring than can be perceived at an aggregate
level, partly because some are still incipient and also
because many of the changes are in conflicting direc-
tions.
In order to survive, manufacturing  firms have
been forced to adapt to their new environment. This
has required substantial investments, which can be
very costly given the limited availability of long-term
financing, as well as the high interest rates that have
prevailed in the region, particularly under stabiliza-
tion policies.
From the information gathered during this inves-
tigation, what are the changes that may be observed
in consumer goods manufacturing firms in Chile,
Mexico and Venezuela   today? The present section
addresses this issue, first by describing the behaviour
of most of the modernizing firms and then by con-
centrating on some specific areas where there have
been major changes.
The modernizing firms are specializing: decreas-
ing the number of production lines, while increasing
the variety of goods manufactured within the produc-
tion lines they maintain. They are decreasing the size
of production batches and the time that it takes to
produce them. They are also decreasing inventories,
particularly those of final goods.
To achieve this, the companies are changing their
layout, following the advice of external consultants
that they hire themselves or that are contacted
through foreign firms, such as clients or companies
they have a licence from. The changes in layout are
no longer conceived as something that will remain in
place for  a long  time, but rather are implemented
with flexibility and a willingness to adapt them regu-
larly as changes in demand require.
The aim of the changes in layout is to facilitate
the production flow and improve quality control. The
introduction of automated control of the production
flow also enables the firm to have precise informa-
tion on individual worker productivity and to detect
bottlenecks quickly.
The plants that are modernizing most success-
fully are those that have been able to systematically
apply  production standards and efficiency  goals in
line with Fordist practices. This has enabled them to
increase  productivity  substantially. Production rou-
tines have also been modified to introduce more qual-
ity checkpoints and, in the most advanced plants, to
increase individual worker responsibility for quality
standards. With respect to whether flexible speciali-
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zation  and greater worker  autonomy are replacing
Fordist practices, the research confirms the findings
of a previous case study in the Brazilian shoe indus-
try that “suggests that more important than the
boundaries are the connections between Fordism and
flexible specialization” (Schmitz, 1995).
Quality has also improved thanks to substantial
upgrading of design capability as professional per-
sonnel are hired and automated equipment is put in
place.
The desire to improve quality and to attain effi-
ciency goals has led firms to modify payment sys-
tems. The changes implemented for this purpose,
described below, indicate that firms are seeking
payment systems that fit their need to upgrade pro-
ductivity and quality standards.
The changes in the organization of production
and in systems of payment are accompanied by
changes in management practices, as firms pass from
a family-based management style to one following
professional guidelines. These changes are in re-
sponse to the increasingly competitive environment,
but they also often coincide with a generational tran-
sition as regards company ownership.
The following are the areas in which the most
important changes are taking place.
a) Vertical integration
An illustration   of changes in macroeconomic
and trade policies resulting in changes at the micro-
economic level is the degree of vertical integration
within firms. High degrees of vertical integration
were advantageous under import substitution policies
because firms selling intermediate goods had consid-
erable market power, particularly when they sold to
firms that were rivals in the finished-product market.
However, this is no longer the case, given the in-
creased options for input procurement outside the
country resulting from trade liberalization.
Indeed, the interviews in vertically integrated
plants provided evidence that for many industries a
high degree of vertical integration has gone from be-
ing an asset to a liability for firms, as it restricts their
flexibility for input procurement. On several occa-
sions, managers in charge of producing final goods
complained about having to use inputs made within
the same firm: an obligation that restricted their pos-
sibilities of purchasing a variety of inputs at low cost
in a reasonable period of time. In most cases, it was
not only cheaper for them to buy inputs outside the
firm, but the delays involved were also reduced.
Every one of the vertically integrated firms said that
they were using increasingly small proportions of in-
puts produced within the same firm.
Plants manufacturing non-competitive intermedi-
ate goods have been particularly severely affected,
since there has not only been a decrease in their pro-
duction of inputs for plants within the same firm, but
the demand for their goods from other firms within
the country has plummeted. Quite often, unless they
provide a very competitive input, vertically inte-
grated plants are an obstacle to the flexibility which
firms now need in order to be able to respond quickly
to changes in demand.
Some companies have begun to address this is-
sue by setting up different firms within a conglomer-
ate and decreasing the obligations of their firms to
buy inputs from related plants. In several cases, the
move towards vertical dis-integration has gone even
further as firms that were formerly integrated have
separated into different firms with different owners.
This allows firms to specialize in separate segments
of the production  sequence, gaining  economies of
scale.
b) Utilization of imported inputs
Along with the decrease in vertical integration
there has been a significant change in input procure-
ment, as firms in the three countries use increasing
amounts of imported inputs. This was only to be ex-
pected after trade liberalization processes combined
with currency appreciation. There was evidence of
this in all three countries, as all firms had increased
their use  of imported inputs in the previous three
years.
Chilean firms used higher percentages of im-
ported inputs than their Mexican and Venezuelan
counterparts. This is because trade liberalization
started earlier in Chile than in the other two coun-
tries. It is also due to the small size of the economy,
which limits the variety of inputs manufactured do-
mestically.
For firms that were not vertically integrated,
trade liberalization was an opportunity to buy a
greater variety of inputs, often of better quality and at
lower cost. The use of imported inputs has played an
important role in firms’ strategies aimed at becoming
more competitive.
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c) Technology
A rough estimation of the technological level of
the firms was made by comparing their equipment
during the interviews with firm executives and visits
to the plants.
The first finding is that when the technological
level of firms in the same industry was compared
across countries, the differences, surprisingly, were
much smaller than would have been expected in view
of the differences in the sizes of the economies.
While it is true that some of the firms with the most
advanced technologies were Mexican, the average
gap between similar industries in the three countries
does not seem to be very wide.
In contrast, there was wide dispersion of techno-
logical levels between firms in the same industry
within the same country. This was the case in Chile,
Mexico and Venezuela, and is evidence of the hetero-
geneity of Latin American industry. At least in tradi-
tional consumer goods manufacturing sectors,
different technological levels seem to be able to
coexist side by side. This dispersion appeared to be
greater in Mexico than in the other two countries.
It was also surprising to find that, for large and
medium-sized companies, there is no systematic cor-
relation between the size of the firm and its techno-
logical level. Several of the largest firms interviewed
had quite low technological levels, while some medium-
sized firms had better equipment, as well as more
modern management practices. This may be due to
the fact that some large firms that are older and ac-
customed to operating in an import-substitution envi-
ronment are addressing other issues, such as increasing
flexibility and subcontracting, before introducing
technological innovations.
Similarly, there does not appear to be any sys-
tematic correlation between investment in hard tech-
nology and company competitiveness. Several firms
had relatively sophisticated equipment yet were not
very competitive. For example, some firms, particu-
larly in  Venezuela, had relatively advanced equip-
ment that they often did not use.
However, while a relatively high technological
level does not necessarily mean that the firm is com-
petitive, the reverse does seem to be true. More than
the technological level they had attained, what
seemed to characterize modernizing firms was their
search for ways of raising their technological level by
acquiring  the specific  equipment that  would allow
them to solve specific problems.
In other words, rather than expenditure on capi-
tal goods for the whole plant, what characterized
modernizing firms was their efforts to “fine-tune” the
incorporation of technology in the plant, and to do so
systematically, on an ongoing basis.
d) Incentive payment systems and management
techniques
In most firms in the region production workers
are still paid on the basis of fixed wages that are a
function of the time spent at the workplace and are
often linked to the evolution of the minimum wage.
Some firms also use piecework.
On the other hand, the goal of improving pro-
ductivity and quality has led many firms to explore
new pay systems. A growing number of companies
interviewed in the course of the research are trying
out new ways to pay production workers that can
result in productivity increases. For example, most of
the firms exporting a substantial proportion of their
output were using new schemes of payment for their
production workers which are innovative, at least
compared with the usual practices in the region. Such
schemes include incentives for attendance and high-
quality output, as well as productivity goals based on
international industrial standards.
Efforts in this direction were most frequent in
Mexico. Half of the firms interviewed in that country
had innovative pay schemes in which attendance and
quality incentives could amount to up to half the
workers’ monthly wage. The purpose was clearly to
find the pay system that would best enable the firms
to improve their productivity, as well as the quality of
their products. There are even a few companies in
Mexico which are paying an extra bonus in return
for a worker’s capability and willingness to work in
different positions within the plant. Similarly, fol-
low-up visits to Venezuelan firms at the beginning of
1995 showed that the most modernizing firms in that
country were also training workers to carry out mul-
tipurpose tasks.
The companies that were introducing new ways
of paying their workers were also among the most
dynamic, as well as the most innovative in other
areas, such as in the introduction of new management
techniques. In fact, this last characteristic is almost a
prerequisite for incentive payment schemes, since
setting up more sophisticated pay systems than those
generally used in Latin America requires procedures
that allow careful monitoring of the productivity and
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quality  of the work of individual employees.3 The
managers of these modernizing firms say that one of
their most important competitive advantages is pre-
cisely their human resources practices. While it is not
yet obvious which of the systems are the most effi-
cient, companies are  clearly aware that improving
productivity and quality requires innovations in in-
centive pay systems.
e) Training
Most of the firms interviewed in Chile and Vene-
zuela provided very little training for their workers.
This was particularly  surprising in the case of the
former country, since Chilean firms can obtain a tax
credit to cover the cost of some training activities and
entrepreneurs in that country stated that deficiencies
in human capital were among the greatest competi-
tive disadvantages they faced (Macario, 1995).
Mexican firms, on the other hand, appeared to be
much  more willing to spend resources on training
their personnel, although, on average, the amount
spent is quite small. Some of the companies inter-
viewed even had small schools in the plant which
provided not only specific training but also general
education programmes.
Mexican companies’ greater disposition to train
their workers is partly due to a combination of the
lower average educational level of the workforce and
the various training programmes being offered by the
government (Federal and regional).
However, the main explanation for Mexican
firms’ greater training efforts is their managers’ de-
sire to achieve a substantial increase in productivity
to counter the competitive pressures they are facing.
The companies that are investing most resources
and energy in training are precisely those which are
trying to overhaul their whole organization.
f) Subcontracting
When import substitution policies prevailed,
there were a few firms in the region that subcon-
tracted part of their production, but this tended to be
the exception rather than a frequent practice. Most
large companies were not under much pressure to
reduce costs and they had a relatively stable market
share. If new operations had to be carried out on a
regular basis, they ended up being undertaken inter-
nally in the firm. Subcontracting was generally used
only for very specialized tasks or for unexpected
surges in demand.
The situation now appears to have radically
changed, and one of the most noteworthy develop-
ments observed during  the interviews was  the re-
markable increase in subcontracting by firms in the
region. This is the result of changes that are occurring
both at the global level and within the region. In the
first place, there has been a considerable surge in
international subcontracting as firms establish dy-
namic networks on a worldwide basis, thanks to the
decrease in transportation costs and improvements in
telecommunications (Dicken, 1992). At the same
time, in Latin America the combination of trade liber-
alization processes and exchange-rate appreciation
has exposed firms to very strong competition, forcing
many companies to downsize and reduce costs. Sub-
contracting plays a key role in firms’ survival strate-
gies, allowing them to reduce their fixed costs and to
respond more quickly to changes in demand.
Most of the companies interviewed had increased
their subcontracting of manufacturing operations in re-
cent years. Moreover, most of them expected subcon-
tracting to increase substantially during the years to
come. Some of them subcontracted the manufacture
of products they had previously produced internally
in the firm, but for which the production lines had
been closed down. In other cases, firms had decided
to centralize product design and subcontract most of
the manufacturing process.
While an increase in subcontracting could have
been reasonably foreseen even at the beginning of the
investigation, the extent to which it is practiced in
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela is quite striking. Not
only has subcontracting within the same country be-
come prevalent, but also many firms are subcontract-
ing abroad. In some cases, companies subcontracted
work to a firm in a neighbouring country which had a
cheaper and better trained workforce, as in the case of
the Venezuelan firms that subcontracted operations in
Colombia. In other cases, companies decided to gain
a competitive edge by going to the region that pro-
duced the goods responsible for taking away their
market shares: in other words, they subcontracted
directly in Asia.
This practice, which is being adopted in a large
variety of sectors, is particularly widespread in gar-
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3 One of the innovations most frequently observed is the intro-
duction of computerized systems that allow monitoring of the
production flow and inventory control.
ment and footwear manufacturing. Rather that letting
themselves be displaced from Latin American mar-
kets by Asian products, firms have decided to sub-
contract at least some production lines directly in Asia.
While some companies have gone all the way,
practically shutting  down domestic production  and
concentrating instead on distribution, most firms
have reacted in a way that will allow them much
more flexibility in the long run: they subcontract pro-
duction in those lines in which they are less competi-
tive, while trying to become very competitive in the
lines they retain. In this way, if there are changes,
such as a depreciation of the exchange rate, they will
still have manufacturing capabilities and can then in-
crease domestic production. Meanwhile, this strategy
allows them to defend their share of the domestic
market, especially in view of exchange-rate apprecia-
tion and the remarkable surge of low-cost Asian ex-
ports of increasingly high quality.
This practice is much more widespread than is
publicly perceived. Entrepreneurs are reluctant to
mention it (more so in Mexico and Venezuela than in
Chile) because they fear a negative reaction. Another
reason is that many trade associations are demanding
government protection against what they claim to be
unfair  competition from Asian  products. Entrepre-
neurs are also reluctant to reveal what is one of the
key elements of their competitive strategy. But the
fact is that the most competitive firms in the region
are following this strategy, which is really a very rea-
sonable one, since it allows the company to survive
and to concentrate on manufacturing the products in
which it is competitive.
g) Distribution and retailing
For most manufacturing industries, distribution
and retailing did not play a key role when import
substitution policies aimed at creating a domestic in-
dustrial sector prevailed. Productive activities were
favoured over distribution, and it was much easier to
obtain subsidized credit to set up an industrial plant
than for retail outlets. Furthermore, industrial manu-
facturers had substantial market power over retailers,
who did not have much choice in purchasing their
merchandise. Hence, production was emphasized
rather than retailing. Even though manufacturers
often distributed their own goods directly to consum-
ers, the core of the manufacturing business was the
plant itself.
Nowadays, circumstances have changed dramati-
cally for most of the traditional consumer goods
manufacturing industries. By opening up their econo-
mies, the Latin American countries have given their
consumers the possibility of choosing among a wide
variety of goods. Import penetration is very strong,
and retailers are no longer restricted to goods pro-
duced domestically. This has produced a shift in
manufacturers’ activities.
This shift became obvious in the course of the
investigation in Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Most
of the executives of modernizing firms said that their
main concern was to become competitive in distribu-
tion and to achieve name recognition for their brand.
They  said that this was the single most important
factor for the survival of their manufacturing activi-
ties, as the market was flooded with goods from other
countries.
Because of this, simultaneously with the de-
crease in the degree of backward vertical integration
there has been a substantial increase in investment to
increase forward integration: many manufacturing
companies believe that ensuring the presence of their
brand in the domestic market and securing a strong
retail structure will increase their possibility of sur-
viving as a firm.
While this situation was noted in all three coun-
tries, it was most evident in Chile. Almost all of the
company executives interviewed in that country said
that ensuring a good retailing system was of the
uppermost importance to them. Sometimes the com-
pany itself owned retail stores, sometimes it   did
not, but at all events retailing is a crucial aspect of
company strategy.
While this situation was also observed in Mexico
and Venezuela, it was not as prevalent there as in
Chile. This is because the relatively small size of the
Chilean domestic market makes capturing a market
share more important. It is also due to the fact that
Chile liberalized foreign trade before Mexico and
Venezuela, and many Chilean firms were forerunners
in recognizing the importance of retailing for manu-
facturing company strategy.
Whatever the main reason may be, the fact is that
although the trend was much more marked in Chile,
the importance of establishing solid distribution net-
works was also a key element of the strategies of the
most competitive firms interviewed in Mexico and
Venezuela. One Venezuelan company executive, who
runs a very interesting, innovative firm, said: “If I
had any investment resources available, I would open
new stores”. Similarly, the Chief Executive Officer of
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the Mexican firm that was among the best-organized
manufacturing plants visited believes that his greatest
competitive disadvantage is his lack of forward inte-
gration.
Another indication of the importance of this
trend is the fact that many companies that were mak-
ing investments were actually concentrating most of
the resources on  improving  the distribution of  the
firm’s products, rather than on manufacturing itself.
In  fact, technological innovations, such as on-line
sales and stock control, were often introduced with
that purpose. Similarly, companies frequently tend to
focus training efforts on their marketing employees,
rather than on production workers.
Moreover, a strong distribution network also al-
lows manufacturers to distribute imported goods,
thus defending the market share of their own brand.
This provides them with the opportunity to have
some control over the prices at which competing im-
ports are sold, as well as making profits on their own
sales. This strategy appears to be very sound from the
manufacturer’s point of view, as it allows firms to
benefit from import surges and to continue manufac-
turing the product lines in which they are still com-
petitive, while at the same time retaining their market
share.
h) Exporting firms
What were the differences observed between
modernizing firms in general and those that regularly
exported a significant proportion of their output (over
15% or 20%)?
In terms of sales and employment, the exporting
firms included in the investigation were quite similar
to those that exported only occasionally, those that
regularly exported a small percentage of their output
and those that did not export at all. While exporting
firms tended to have slightly higher employment and
sales levels than non-exporting firms, the differences
were not significant between the two groups, for a
given industry.
There does appear to be a minimum sales thresh-
old beneath which it is difficult to find firms that
export regularly. This is probably due to the fixed
costs involved in exporting, such as purchasing
equipment that enables the firm to achieve better
quality, acquiring clients abroad, and carrying out the
paperwork required to export. But above a certain
level there no longer seems to be a systematic corre-
lation between company size and export activity:
while in a given industry most exporting is indeed
carried out by large firms, there are medium-sized
firms that export and many large firms that do not
export at all. The growing number of medium-sized
Latin American firms that are exporting is an inter-
esting phenomenon that deserves further study.
However, the one significant difference between
exporting and non-exporting firms was the greater
concern that the former have for quality improve-
ment. Exporting firms are increasingly exporting
goods manufactured according to export-market
specifications, instead of simply exporting goods
identical to those they sell on the domestic market.
The importance of quality for exporting firms was
reflected in plant layout specifications, as well as
training and wage incentive systems. Exporting firms
provided training more frequently than non-exporters
and tended to have introduced more innovations in
wage systems.
Exporting and selling on the domestic market
should not necessarily be viewed as involving a
trade-off. In fact they can often be interrelated
choices, particularly in small economies such as
Chile. It may be that a firm needs to export in order
to attain the scale that allows it to be competitive in
the domestic market. Exporting also provides learn-
ing opportunities for firms, as they learn how to
satisfy requirements in more demanding markets.
This learning has a positive spillover effect in the
domestic market. At the same time, a solid position in
the domestic market allows a firm to bear the cost of
going into new export activities.
The investigation leads to the conclusion that in
traditional  consumer-goods industries there  are no
significant differences between large and medium-
sized modernizing firms that focus mainly on the do-
mestic market and exporting firms. The only
exceptions are the importance of quality for export-
ing firms and the learning opportunities provided by
exporting. It may be said that in general exporters are
modernizers, but not all modernizers are exporters.
4. Flexibility
The previous sections described how the most inno-
vative consumer-goods manufacturing firms in Chile,
Mexico and Venezuela are undergoing important
changes in the way production is organized, in verti-
cal integration and input procurement, as well as in
management style and in wage systems, among other
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features. Companies are adapting and learning how to
be competitive in the new economic environment
prevailing in the Latin American countries.
Rather than a massive once-for-all overhaul of
the firm, however, the most relevant characteristic of
these innovating companies is the flexibility they dis-
play in  continuously  improving their performance,
for example thanks to the ability to pinpoint the areas
where bottlenecks are most severe. Transformations
are now carried out on an ongoing basis, sometimes
through a series of small changes. These transforma-
tions finally result in a massive overhaul of produc-
tion practices, but of a different nature from that
achieved through a once-and-for-all effort.
The importance of such flexibility should not be
underestimated, both in production and in distribu-
tion: firms that have the highest success rate (and the
highest survival rate in the face of very adverse
shocks, such as some companies in Venezuela) are
those that are able to react quite rapidly and adapt to
new circumstances.
For example, one of the areas where flexibility is
clearly important is in enabling firms to develop
more adaptable production systems that allow them
to react to changes in consumer demand and to pro-
duce a wide variety of goods with a limited number
of production lines. Changes in production are in-
creasingly demand-led, and the time it takes for firms
to introduce changes in response to changes in de-
mand has decreased.
Another area in which flexibility is critical is the
ability of firms to react to changes in the exchange
rate, retaining a minimum production capability that
enables them to cover their market share, while being
willing to transform themselves rapidly into distribu-
tors of some lines of imported goods when there is a
substantial appreciation of the  exchange rate. The
strategy of becoming the main importers of goods
competing with their own products and distributing
them through their own distribution channels was one
of the strategies hesitantly adopted by a few firms in
Chile in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In retrospect,
we can now see that this strategy was to become very
successful.
Entrepreneurs have learnt from this past experi-
ence, and the most successful and resilient firms in
the three countries are those that have the flexibility
to convert themselves rapidly into importers and dis-
tributors of competing imported goods. They have
realized that this is the best way to be able to manage
prices and to set prices of imported versus domesti-
cally produced goods, according to their production
capabilities. This strategy allows the firm to use its
own distribution channels, while continuing the pro-
duction of its most competitive goods. Behind this
strategy is the idea that if the company does not do
this, another firm will seize the opportunity and dis-
place it from the market.
However, while becoming distributors of im-
ported goods is a strategy that is increasingly being
put into practice by enterprising Mexican and Vene-
zuelan manufacturers, and continues to be practiced
by the Chilean ones, it is not always readily acknow-
ledged by them, since they are reluctant to admit that
they are becoming major importers of competing
goods.
5. The shift in the core of the manufacturing
business
In addition to the importance of flexibility for com-
pany   strategy, another important feature of the
changes that are occurring in companies’ behaviour is
the shift in what constitutes the core of their strategy.
Under import substitution, manufacturing firms
had a relatively advantageous position with respect to
distributors and retailing firms: they could obtain
credit at preferential rates and special permits to im-
port inputs, and they could lobby to stop imports of
competing goods once they had set up local produc-
tion facilities, among many other advantages. Al-
though some manufacturing firms were also retailers,
the core of the manufacturing business was produc-
tion.
Today, the situation for Latin American manu-
facturing firms is radically different. They face vigor-
ous competition in the domestic market, both from
imports and from other domestic firms that are trying
to defend their market share. Consumers have also
grown more demanding as they have had access to a
wider variety of goods, not only as a result of trade
liberalization, but also because of exchange-rate ap-
preciation.
A competitive manufacturing firm now not only
has to upgrade its organization of production but
must also have an active and aggressive retailing
strategy. Trade liberalization, particularly in a context
of currency appreciation, has significantly increased
the importance of distribution and retailing. The most
innovative manufacturing firms studied in the survey
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TABLE 1
Summary of strategies used by manufacturing firms in the 1990s
Modernizing firms Non-modernizing firms
Areas in which differences Flexibility in the continuous introduction of changes Rigid passive behaviour
are highly significant in production and distribution in response to changes
in demand and in the macroeconomic environment
(such as the exchange rate)
Hiring of external consultants for upgrading Exclusive reliance on in-house expertise
Productivity is continuously measured Productivity data not available
Innovative incentive payment systems Traditional wage systems
Professional management Family-based management
Production changes are demand-led Limited changes in response to
production concerns
Large increases in subcontracting based on long-term Subcontracting is nonexistent or very
relationships limited
Strong interaction between production and distribution Firm focuses exclusively on production
Whenever possible, closer ties with retailers or significant Loose ties with retailers
increases in retailing carried out by the firm itself
Areas in which differences Substantial decrease in vertical integration: Decrease in vertical integration
are significant related plants become independent firms
Significant increase in the use of imported inputs Increase in use of imported inputs
Efforts to improve design capability Limited design capability
Reduction in stocks Large stocks maintained
Regular changes in production layout Rigid process layout
Reduction in the number of production lines Number of production lines maintained
Increased product diversity within production lines Limited product diversity within
production lines
Quality is important Quality is not a priority
Individual worker responsibility for quality Quality control at a few points on the
assembly line
Technological innovations are introduced at key points, If introduced, technological innovations
after thorough assessment of existing bottlenecks are bought in a package, not in
response to a careful assessment of
the plant’s strengths and weaknesses
Technological innovations are introduced regularly on a Technological innovations are introduced
continuous basis on a once-and-for-all basis
The firm provides training for its workers The firm does not train its workers
were those that had a network of retailing outlets,
with the goal of preserving their share in the domestic
market and benefiting from the sale of imported
goods. Retailing also allows manufacturing firms to
increase their profit margins, since it is in essence a
non-tradeable activity in which profit margins have
soared in recent years. It also allows firms to manage
flexibly a product mix of goods manufactured in their
own plants and imported goods, depending on the
evolution of the exchange rate.
The follow-up interviews with Venezuelan firms
in 1995 showed that the most competitive firms were
putting into practice a strategy of decreasing the
amount of goods they sold to intermediaries and in-
creasing the proportion of goods they retailed them-
selves. Executives of these firms said that the key
survival strategy for their firms was to improve the
distribution network and retail most of the products
themselves.
The transformations in the way the Latin Ameri-
can economies integrate into world markets have had
significant consequences for manufacturing firms’
behaviour. Manufacturing firms need to upgrade their
supply capabilities in response to changes in demand.
However, in order to be able to carry out this upgrad-
ing, which is crucial for their survival, manufacturing
firms must first be able to defend their presence in
the market. What has changed as a result of trade
liberalization, globalization and the transformations
in the firms’ economic environment is precisely the
core of the manufacturing business: in order to sur-
vive and become competitive, manufacturing firms
must now improve their marketing capabilities, and
in order to do this they must transform their supply
capabilities.
6. Uncertainty
Macroeconomic stability and certainty that economic
policy would be sustained were among the most im-
portant positive characteristics of the economic envi-
ronment mentioned by Chilean and Mexican
entrepreneurs during the interviews. These were car-
ried out in 1993, before the Mexican crisis that began
with the December 1994 devaluation.
In contrast, for the Venezuelan firms interviewed
in 1993 one of the main obstacles to investing in
upgrading and in export projects was the uncertainty
surrounding the country’s economic policies. This
was confirmed by the follow-up interviews with
Venezuelan firms in 1995, which showed that compa-
nies which had pursued active upgrading policies
were either in an extremely vulnerable position or
bankrupt, while those which had adopted a passive
attitude had benefited from their decision not to up-
grade.
The specific cases of the two largest garment
manufacturers interviewed in Venezuela, hereafter
called firm A and firm B, illustrate this. When the
first interviews took place (March 1993), these two
firms had decided to adopt two distinctly different
strategies: firm A had decided that it would continue
operating largely the same way it had operated under
import substitution and that it would not invest in
upgrading production capability, nor in improving the
quality of the goods it manufactured. This conserva-
tive strategy was also adopted for exports, in which
the firm decided it would not invest any resources.
Firm B, on the other hand, had decided to invest
a substantial amount of resources in a complete up-
grading of the firm’s production capability, both in
terms of the quality of the goods produced and the
volume of production. To achieve this, it hired inter-
national  consultants who redesigned the plant and
trained the employees. Simultaneously, technological
innovations were introduced as new equipment was
purchased and production procedures were trans-
formed. The company’s goal was to cope with the
strong competition from imports in the domestic mar-
ket and then continue to expand its markets by ex-
porting.
At the time of the initial interviews, it seemed
that firm A would slowly die owing to increased im-
port competition and its inability (or the lack of inter-
est  of its owners) to react to the change from an
import substitution model to an open economy. In
contrast, it appeared that the strategy of firm B would
allow it to become competitive in the new environ-
ment, to survive import competition in the domestic
market and to export on a regular basis.
When the follow-up interviews were carried out
two years later, in 1995, however, circumstances
were strikingly different. The new government of
Venezuela had decided to reverse several of the pol-
icy reforms carried out at the end of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s. While the trade liber-
alization policy was not formally reversed, this did
occur in practice because of exchange controls that
made it difficult for firms to have access to hard cur-
rency for imports, including inputs. Competition
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from imports had thus been slashed. Furthermore, the
pegging of the exchange rate at a time of high infla-
tion  made  it extremely difficult for manufacturing
firms to export.
In these circumstances, firm A had been rela-
tively successful thanks to its decision not to invest in
upgrading the plant. This strategy had allowed the
firm to maintain a solid financial position without
incurring debts. It had proved successful because
changes in economic policy, such as the introduction
of exchange controls, had resulted in a substantial
decrease in competition from imports, while at the
same time interest rates went up. Thus, firms that had
adopted a passive attitude and had decided not to
change their strategy and not to upgrade benefited
from the decreased import competition in the domes-
tic market and from a sound financial position.
In contrast, companies which had invested in
upgrading their production capability were hurt by
the increase in interest rates. Firm B, for example,
was in severe financial difficulties, having incurred
debts to finance the upgrading. Although it was still
able to export, exports had been curtailed by the ob-
stacles to importing good-quality competitive inputs,
such as exchange controls and the appreciation of the
exchange rate. Complex and discretionary adminis-
trative procedures also made importing and exporting
very difficult. Hence, firms that had invested in up-
grading and had tried to become competitive were
ultimately losers compared to those that had adopted
a passive attitude.
It is clear that in the long run this situation will
not last. Venezuela cannot support an artificial ex-
change rate forever, nor will it always be able to sus-
tain policies that tend to limit competition from
imports. Venezuelan firms will eventually find them-
selves in a competitive environment once again, and
in those circumstances firm A will clearly be forced
to change or it will lose a substantial amount of mar-
ket share, while firm B will reap the benefits of its
investments.
In the meantime, firm B will undoubtedly gain a
bigger market share even if the economy does not
open up, thanks to its upgrading efforts. When inter-
viewed in 1995, this company was also gaining mar-
ket share because so many domestic firms were
failing. The question is whether firms that invested in
upgrading will still be operating in the long run or
whether they will go under because of the financial
burden of upgrading and the reversal of economic
policy.
Thus, the managers who had believed the
government’s declarations that trade liberalization
would be sustained and that they should invest in
export projects were those whose firms were most
severely damaged by the policy reversal. The appre-
ciation of the exchange rate that resulted from the
exchange controls and the pegging of the currency
within an inflationary process made their exports less
competitive on foreign markets. The obstacles to im-
porting inputs caused by the exchange controls and
customs red tape  were an  additional difficulty for
those firms which had increased the use of imported
inputs as one of their upgrading strategies.
Therefore, the interviews carried out throughout
the investigation show that uncertainty over eco-
nomic policy leads to a substantial decrease in com-
pany investment. There is no incentive for firms to
invest in long-term projects when policy reversals
and macroeconomic instability render the rate of re-
turn unpredictable.
Comparison of the behaviour of firms in the
three countries covered by the research shows that
uncertainty explains why more firms do not change,
or do not change faster. Uncertainty has a twofold
negative effect on entrepreneurs’ decisions to trans-
form their firms: they are uncertain as to what they
should do, and also about the sustainability of eco-
nomic policy. They are often aware that they must
alter the way their firms operate, but they are not
certain what changes should be made, or how. This
shows the importance of providing companies with
technical support on best practices through pub-
lic/private sector networks. However, the uncertainty
that probably has the most negative impact on firms’
decisions concerning upgrading is whether trade lib-
eralization will be sustained or not. If the policy in
this respect is not completely credible, many firms
will be reluctant to change their behaviour, and this
indecision can result in many more firms going under
than could reasonably have been expected.
Hence, it is of the utmost importance that major
policy changes should  be credible, if  firms are to
change their behaviour and try to become more com-
petitive. It may reasonably be concluded that, if there
is uncertainty, most firms will not change, or will not
change so quickly. Upgrading requires a willingness
on  the part of company managers to change their
firms’ practices and to make heavy investments, as
well as the certainty that the new policies are there to
stay.
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IV
Conclusions
Manufacturing firms in Latin America are undergo-
ing substantial transformations in order to be com-
petitive in the new conditions marked by trade
liberalization, globalization and, in general, changes
in the economic environment. Many firms still have a
passive or reactive attitude, with behaviour quite
similar to that described in section II. However, the
overwhelming majority of entrepreneurs in the region
are aware that they must change the way they operate
and have already begun to do so: the behaviour of
most companies  is completely different now from
what it was 10 or 15 years ago.
These changes in companies’ behaviour are
strongly influenced by the transformations in macro-
economic and trade policies, as well as in the general
economic environment. Evidence of this may be seen
from the differences in firms’ behaviour across coun-
tries.
However, the study showed that there were firms
in all three countries which were changing their be-
haviour  irrespective  of the economic environment,
adopting particularly innovative and aggressive
strategies. While Venezuelan firms on average tended
to be more passive and reluctant to change than their
Chilean and Mexican counterparts, the most competi-
tive Venezuelan firms had strategies that were sur-
prisingly similar to those of the most aggressive firms
in Chile and Mexico. Much may be learnt from the
behaviour of these firms, particularly for the formula-
tion of policy recommendations.
In general, there were no differences between ex-
porting firms and modernizing firms that sell mostly
on the domestic market, except that exporting firms
seemed to have much greater concern for quality up-
grading and had greater learning opportunities than
non-exporting ones. The investigation did show,
however, that modernizing the firm was a condition
for sustained export activity.
The transformation that has taken place in what
is seen as the core of the manufacturing business
was  one of the most significant results of the re-
search. At least for the most innovative consumer-
goods manufacturing firms, this core has shifted
from concentration mainly on production matters to
an approach which combines the manufacture of
goods with their distribution, and often the distribu-
tion of other domestic and imported goods as well.
This is the point in the production/distribution seg-
ment where manufacturing firms have greater
chances of simultaneously increasing their profits and
defending their market share. Whatever strategy al-
lows firms to be successful at this crucial point will
be a decisive factor in determining the competitive-
ness of Latin American manufacturing firms in the
years to come.
The changes that are taking place in the econo-
mies of the region have had significant consequences
for Latin American manufacturing companies and
have brought about substantial changes in their be-
haviour. Finding out more about these changes is a
prerequisite for understanding trends, as well as for
making policy recommendations aimed at improving
company competitiveness.
Innovative firms have adopted a flexible type
of behaviour and are upgrading their production
and  marketing  capabilities. They have  made  sig-
nificant changes in terms of vertical integration,
input procurement,  technological innovations,  in-
centive payment systems, management techniques,
training and subcontracting, as well as in distribu-
tion and retailing.
However, even modernizing entrepreneurs fre-
quently felt that they needed to make even more
effort to upgrade their firms. The cost of doing so
and, more importantly, the difficulties in obtaining
appropriate information on the best practice in a
given industry, have been obstacles to the intro-
duction of large-scale transformations in a short pe-
riod  of time. These  obstacles were naturally even
greater for non-modernizing firms, whose managers
knew they had to change the way they operated,
but were uncertain about what needed to be done
and how. While some entrepreneurs in the region will
remain passive and will continue operating as they
did under import substitution as long as they can,
there are many managers who would like to upgrade
their firms but lack the necessary information for
doing so.
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This suggests that governments have an impor-
tant role to play in giving support to programmes that
provide firms with information on best practices, par-
ticularly in matters relating to changes in layout,
quality improvement, incentive payment systems,
training, etc. A key activity that yields many positive
externalities is providing firms with information on
export markets.
An effective way of supplementing inadequate
information  is through  setting  up industry-specific
technological  centres  to  promote the upgrading of
firms’ supply capability. These centres should cover
the areas in which innovation is crucial, such as those
described above. Governments should sponsor such
centres, but they should be created jointly with the
private sector, particularly with entrepreneurial asso-
ciations. These centres could also foster associations
in which firms could join together to obtain better
conditions for input procurement, technical assistance
and distribution than they could obtain individually.
A good example of such a centre is that established in
Colombia by the Asociación Colombiana de Indus-
trias Plásticas (ACOPLASTICOS), or the Centro de Pro-
ductividad Industrial (CEPRI) recently set up in Chile
by the private sector with government support.
Finally, there are several important criteria that
must be taken into account when considering policy
formulation:
i) The most important role for policy is that of
creating a stable economic environment in which firms
can plan long-term  investments. As already noted,
uncertainty promotes non-productive behaviour;
ii) Policies should be designed for effective im-
plementation and should be subject to regular evalu-
ation. If not, they may prove ineffective and give rise
to private-sector distrust of the government;
iii) Policies should explicitly seek to promote the
upgrading of firms and not be a disguised pretext for
a return to protectionism;
iv) To be effective, policies should be designed
and implemented in close coordination with the pri-
vate sector.
The new economic framework existing in most
Latin American countries today, together with the in-
crease in globalization worldwide, represents both a
challenge and an opportunity for most manufacturing
firms in the region. Many firms have already com-
pletely transformed their behaviour. Others will not
change, irrespective of the policy environment they
are in. There is a third group, however, made up of
the vast majority of manufacturing firms, whose
managers are willing to change and have begun to
make some changes. This is the group that economic
policy should target if the goal is for the region to
have the capacity to grow at reasonably high rates.
(Original: English)
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